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CHAPTER Vni
CLASSES OF PERSONS COVERED BY
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
Prior to the treaty era, sending states were prone to claim
blanket immunity for their troops, and receiving states to claim
complete jurisdiction over them. The treaty era has been charac-
terized by more qualified claims, giving rise to allocations of
jurisdiction recognizing the legitimate interests of both sending
and receiving states. The status of the accused, in terms of his
relationship to both the sending and receiving states has, in this
connection, come under closer scrutiny. Every relationship to
the sending state's armed forces is not of itself enough to affect
jurisdiction.
Delimiting the categories of individuals who should be covered
by the NATO Agreement gave rise to one of the major con-
troversies in the NATO negotiations. The solutions reached in
the NATO Agreement, as well as in other status of forces agree-
ments, were predicated on the assumption that American courts-
martial could constitutionally try civilian employees of the armed
forces and dependents. 1 Those solutions will be analyzed initially
without reference to the later decisions 2 of the Supreme Court
denying such jurisdiction to American courts-martial in peace-
time. The analysis indicates that some civilian employees and,
particularly, dependents were commonly not included among
those, jurisdiction over whom was qualified by the treaty. This
suggests that the impact of the Supreme Court decisions was
somewhat less than many have assumed, although the appraisal
should take into account that many receiving states were pre-
pared, prior to the Supreme Court decisions, to waive their juris-
diction over civilian employees and dependents in many instances.
1 Madson v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952)
.
*Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960); Gresham v. Hagen, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo
and Wilson v. Bohlander, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
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MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES
There was no significant difference of opinion among the NATO
negotiators regarding the appropriateness of granting the agreed
range of immunities to all members of the armed forces. 3 There
was substantial agreement that the relationship between a state
and a member of its armed forces was the paramount relation-
ship. Nationality, even in the receiving state, should not affect
the status of members of a visiting force. 4 This is also true under
8
It seems clear enough that the NATO agreement does not modify the
rule of international law regarding the status of the crews of warships in
the territorial waters and ports of another state when on board. It is true
that the Agreement uses the phrases "when in the territory," "within the
territory" and the like, e.g., in Article I 1 (a), denning "force" as "the
personnel belonging to the land, sea or air armed forces of one Contracting
Party when in the territory of another Contracting Party," and it could be
said that "territory" includes territorial waters and ports. See Canard v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923). It seems implicit in Article VII as a whole,
however, that it was intended to apply only to armed forces on land, and
such phrases as that in the Preamble, "Considering that the forces of one
Party may be sent, by arrangement, to serve in the territory of another
Party," point to the same conclusion. Apparently the point was never raised
in the negotiations; it seems inconceivable that if the negotiators had in-
tended to change the well-established rule regarding the crews of warships,
they would have done so without discussion.
It is equally clear that the status of crews of warships on shore is
governed by the Agreement.
* Apparently only the Portuguese Representative felt that nationality in
the receiving state should prevail over membership in the visiting force. "He
pointed out that under the present text, nationals of the receiving State
who were members of a foreign force present in the territory of the receiv-
ing State, could escape by this means from the application of the laws of
their country. He thought it would be unfortunate if there were any
difference of treatment between a Portuguese soldier, for example, who was
a member of the Portuguese army, and a Portuguese soldier who was a
member of a United States force present in Portugal. The same restriction
should be adopted for the members of a force or for those of a civilian
component."
The Chairman answered, in part, that "it might be dangerous in certain
cases, under Articles VII [on criminal jurisdiction] and VIII, for example,
to withdraw the privileges given * * * from nationals who were members of
a force." MS-R (51) 13. See also MS (D) 51-16.
The soundness of the NATO solution is evident when, as under the NATO
Agreement, members of the visiting force enjoy only a qualified immunity,
for inter se offenses and offenses committed in the performance of duty. It
is less evident, though on balance still defensible, when the immunity of the
members of the visiting force extends to private acts which are not inter se
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other recent agreements, with some exceptions. 5 The NATO ap-
proach is consistent with prior practice 6 and with prevailing
attitudes with respect to the crews of merchant vessels as well as
offenses. Then to disregard nationality means that one who, while in the
pursuit of his private interests, commits an offense in the state of which he
is a national against a fellow national, is immune from that state's
jurisdiction.
5 The Convention with West Germany provided : "The definition 'members
of the Forces' shall include Germans only if they enlisted or were inducted
into, or were employed by, the armed Forces of the Power concerned in the
territory of that Power and at that time either had their permanent place
of residence there or had been resident there at least a year."
The Protocol of Signature to the Agreement with West Germany takes a
different approach, providing in the Agreed Minutes Re Article I that "Ex-
cept in cases of military exigency, the Governments of the sending States
will make every effort not to station in territory of the Federal Republic as
members of a force persons who are solely Germans."
Under the Leased Bases Agreement the United States was accorded pri-
mary jurisdiction (Art. IV (1) (C)) in cases in which "A person other than
a British subject shall be charged with having committed an offence of any
other nature within a leased area. * * *" Under the Agreement the "person"
could be a member of the United States armed forces, so that in this instance
the status of a member of such forces did vary from the norm if he was a
British subject. Under the revised Leased Bases Agreement, however,
"British Subject" is defined so as to exclude "a member of a United States
force" (Art. IV, para. (9)), and nationality no longer affects the status of
American troops.
The definitions of the term "United States Forces" in both the United
States-Ethiopian Agreement and the United States-Libya Agreement are so
phrased as to leave some doubt whether nationality affects the status of a
member of the force. The problem is not likely to arise in either country.
Under the Philippines Agreement, on the other hand—and there the matter
is of practical importance—the possibility that nationality could affect the
status of a member of the United States force is expressly negatived in
the crucial case. The Agreement gives the United States jurisdiction over
"Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the
offender and offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of
the armed forces of the United States on active duty) * * *."
6 See Note 14, infra. None of the agreements there cited excepts from the
members of a force nonnationals of the sending state, including nationals
of the receiving state. The Anglo-French treaty of Dec. 15, 1915 {supra, p.
116) referred to "persons belonging to these Armies * * * of whatever
nationality the accused may be," and the Franco-American notes of January
3 and January 14, 1918 {supra, p. 116) to "persons subject to the jurisdiction
of those forces whatever be * * * the nationality of the accused," a phrase
which was repeated in both drafts of the proposed World War I Anglo-
American Agreement {supra, p. 122, n. 30).
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warships, although as to diplomats the trend is to the contrary.7
The NATO Agreement also resolved, on the whole in favor of
the sending state, several lesser issues which had caused diffi-
culty in the past. It had been asserted that any immunity which
visiting forces might enjoy under international law was accorded
to them only as members of a unit. Therefore, it was said, a
member of an armed force was not entitled to immunity in a
country other than that in which his unit was stationed, even
though he was there on duty. The same attitude was expressed
in the course of the NATO negotiations. 8 The Agreement never-
theless clearly accords the agreed immunities to such detached
members of a force, as well as to those on leave or even AWOL
in the state in which their unit is stationed ; they are in the state
"in connexion with their official duties." 9 Those on leave or
AWOL in a member state in which no unit of their force is sta-
tioned are as clearly not entitled to immunity. 10 Technically, the
same is true regarding those on leave in a state in which units of
their force, but not their unit, are stationed. In practice, how-
ever, they are accorded the agreed immunities. 11
7 Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed April
18, 1961, provides: "1. Except insofar as additional privileges and immuni-
ties may be granted by the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is a
national of or permanently resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity
from jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts performed in
the exercise of his functions." Paragraph 2 of Article 38 limits the immuni-
ties of other members of the staff and servants to those "admitted by the
receiving State." See also Articles 8 and 37 of the Convention, and Section
77 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 255.
For earlier views, see Hall, p. 229, footnote, and Preuss, "Capacity for
Legation and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities," 10 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 170, 176 (1932).
8 MS-R (51) 13. Comment a to Section 54 of the Restatement, Foreign
Relations Law, p. 182, states that "Detached military personnel on recrea-
tional status or on individual assignment are not within the meaning of the
term 'force.'
"
9 "The Working Group recognized that the Article should be so amended
as * * * not to exclude the case of members of a force on leave in the same
State in which their force was present." MS-R (51) 13.
10 The words "in connexion with their official duties" were inserted to meet
the objection of the Danish and Norwegian representatives who felt "that
members of a force who might be present in Denmark on leave, for example,
could hardly be covered by the Agreement." MS-R (51) 13.
11 Snee and Pye, Status of Forces Agreements and Criminal Jurisdiction
13 (1957). The Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and
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The practical consequences of including those on temporary
duty or, in some circumstances, on leave among those covered by
a treaty should be kept in mind in considering whether according
that status is justified. Under the NATO Agreement it can mean
primary jurisdiction in the sending state only for offenses in the
performance of duty and inter se offenses. For those on leave or
AWOL, it can normally mean only immunity for inter se offenses.
Not all the earlier treaties dealt with temporary duty and leave
situations in the same way as the NATO Agreement does,12 nor
do all the post-World War II treaties.13
the United States of America on the Status of Persons on Leave, signed the
same day as the Agreement with West Germany, specifically accords the
standard immunities to members of the armed forces and civilian employees
stationed in Europe or North Africa and their dependents when on leave in
West Germany.
12 The Anglo-French Declaration of Dec. 15, 1915 (supra, p. 116) used the
phrase "persons belonging to these Armies in whatever territory and of
whatever nationality the accused may be." The American agreements with
France (supra, p. 116, n. 13) and Belgium (supra, p. 117, n. 14) read: "per-
sons subject to the jurisdiction of those forces whatever the territory in which
they operate or the nationality of the accused," as did the Draft Agreement
proposed by the British and the United States governments (supra, p. 122,
n. 30). Either phrase, read literally, seems broad enough to cover those on
temporary duty and on leave, but in Rex v. Aughet, supra, p. 119, n. 21, the
British government apparently took the position that the Anglo-Belgian
treaty, comparable to the Anglo-French Declaration, did not cover those on
temporary duty. The holding was, however, that it did. All these agreements
gave exclusive jurisdiction to the sending state.
13
It appears that under the Agreements with Korea, Saudi Arabia,
Ethiopia, the revised Leased Bases Agreement, and the Agreement with the
Philippines, the occasion for the presence of a member of the United States
forces in the receiving state is immaterial, as it was under the Convention
with West Germany. But the Agreement with Iceland uses the phrase "all
such personnel being in the territory of Iceland in connection with operations
under this Agreement"; that with Libya "who are in the territory of Libya
in connection with operations under the present Agreement"; that with the
Federation of the West Indies "who are there solely for the purposes of this
Agreement"; and that with Australia "in Australia in connection with ac-
tivities agreed upon by the two Governments." See also the British Agree-
ment with Ethiopia, [1951] 93 U.N.T.S. 320. In none of these states could
the situation arise of a member of the United States forces being on
temporary duty or on leave in a state in which no United States forces
were stationed, as it can in some NATO countries.
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CIVILIANS
Whether civilians employed by visiting armed forces—the so-
called "civilian component"—should have the same immunity
from the jurisdiction of the receiving state as members of visiting
armed forces provoked prolonged debate among the NATO
negotiators. There was, however, general agreement that de-
pendents should not enjoy such immunities.
The comments of writers regarding the immunity of armed
forces characteristically make no reference to the civilian com-
ponent and prior agreements show no consistent pattern.14 There
14 "That Act [The United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942
of the United Kingdom] goes beyond the [Angelo-French] declaration of 1915
and international usage in its inclusion of persons and groups who are not
technically members of military forces but are associated with them and are
subject to military law." Rand, J., in Reference Re Exemption of U.S.
Forces from Canadian Criminal Law, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 11, 48. See also
Chow Hung Ching v. The King, 11 Commw. L.R. 449 (Aust. 1948), dis-
tinguishable because the civilians there involved were not accompanying an
armed force.
The Anglo-French Declaration of Dec. 15, 1915 {supra, p. 116), the model
for many of the World War I agreements, referred to "the exclusive
competence of the tribunals of their respective Armies with regard to per-
sons belonging to these Armies," and left to local jurisdiction "persons not
belonging to" the armies. The Exchange of Notes of January 3 and 14,
1918 between the United States and France used the broader phrase, "per-
sons subject to the jurisdiction of those forces whatever be the territory in
which they operate or the nationality of the accused," and the word "per-
sons" was denned to include "together with the persons enrolled in the
Army, Navy and Marine Corps, any other person who under the American
or French law is subject to military or naval jurisdiction, especially mem-
bers of the Red Cross regularly accepted by the Government of the United
States of America or the Government of the French Republic in so far as
the American or French law and the customs of war place them under mili-
tary or naval jurisdiction." The Belgian-American Exchange of Notes of
July 5 and September 6, 1918 incorporated the same provisions, as did the
American draft of the proposed agreement with Great Britain of August
13, 1919; the British draft of May 31, 1919 had omitted the provision de-
fining "persons."
The United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act, 1942, 5 and 6 Geo.
6, c. 31, applied to "a member of the military or naval forces of the United
States of America," but further provided that "For the purposes of this Act
and of the Allied Forces Act, 1940, in its application to the military and
naval forces of the United States of America, all persons who are by the law
of the United States of America for the time being subject to the military
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or naval law of that country shall be deemed to be members of the said
forces."
The World War II agreements show no consistent pattern. The Chinese-
American Arrangement of May 21, 1943, 57 Stat. 1248, E.A.S. 360, [1948]
14 U.N.T.S. 358, and the Agreement between the United States and Belgium
relating to the Congo, [1951] 109 U.N.T.S. 150, refer only to "members of
such forces." The Sino-British Agreement of July 7, 1945, [1948] 14
U.N.T.S. 462 "* * * includes uniformed members (i) of political or civil
staffs attached to the British forces, (ii) of the women's auxiliary to the said
forces, (iii) of the nursing staffs, male and female, (iv) of the staff of the
Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes * * * members of the crews (other
than Chinese nationals) of merchant ships belonging to or chartered or
requisitioned by or on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom
* * * who are operating in conjunction with the British naval authorities."
The Agreement of March 31, 1942 between the United States and Liberia,
56 Stat. 1621, E.A.S. 275, [1948-49] 23 U.N.T.S. 302, covered "the military
and civilian personnel of the Government of the United States and their
families." The United States-Netherlands Agreement of May 16, 1944,
[1951] 1 UST & OIA 601, TIAS No. 2212, [1952] 132 U.N.T.S. 356, and
the Anglo-Belgian Agreement of the same date, [1951] 90 U.N.T.S. 284,
contained virtually identical provisions, that in the former reading "the
Service courts and authorities of the Allies * * * will have exclusive jurisdic-
tion over all members of their forces and over all persons of non-Netherlands
nationality not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who ac-
company those forces and are subject to their naval, military or air force
law." The Agreement between the United States and France of August 25,
1944, supra, p. 114, provided that "British or American nationals not be-
longing to such forces who are employed by or who accompany these forces,
and are subject to Allied Naval, Military or Air Force Law, will for this
purpose be regarded as members of the Allied Forces. The same will apply
to such persons, if possessing the nationality of another Allied state pro-
vided they were not first recruited in any French territory. If they were so
recruited they will be subject to French jurisdiction in the absence of other
arrangements between the authorities of their state and the French au-
thorities." The Agreement of Septembr 3, 1947 between the United States
and Italy, 61 Stat. 3661, TIAS No. 1694, [1950] 67 U.N.T.S. 16, stated:
"13. The term 'United States Forces' when used in this agreement
shall be defined as United States Armed Forces including persons of
non-Italian nationality not belonging to such forces but who are em-
ployed by or who accompany or serve with those forces and the de-
pendents of such persons, and Governmental organizations and accredited
agencies operating under or in conjunction with such forces whenever
applicable. Included in the foregoing are
:
Class I. United States citizens who are
:
1. War Department civilian employees
2. Personnel of the American Red Cross
3. Personnel employed by the Army Exchange Service
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is a discernible functional basis for granting such civilians im-
munity, but the functions they serve are so diverse that one can-
not generalize, and in any event the argument seems less
compelling than in the case of military personnel. Perhaps a
better case can be made on the basis that maintaining discipline
and control over the armed forces requires that the commander
also be able to maintain discipline and control over those accom-
panying the force, and this requires exclusive jurisdiction in the
sending state. It can hardly be said, however, that any rule of
international law accords immunity—except, possibly, for official
acts—to civilian employees accompanying armed forces, what-
ever the rule may be regarding members of such forces. The
success of the American representatives in securing the same
immunities for the civilian component as for members of the
armed forces under the NATO Agreement involved a major con-
cession by other NATO members. 15
The original American draft would have given the same status
to military personnel and the civilian component, together con-
stituting the "contingent," defined as those subject to the military
4. Other personnel possessing United States Armed Forces orders,
for the period covered by the order.
Class II. United States citizens and aliens who are
:
1. Dependents of United States Armed Forces personnel, regardless
of nationality.
2. Dependents of Class I personnel indicated above.
It can be said of these agreements, in general, that the Tfnited States and
Great Britain (but not other states) were largely successful in obtaining
immunity for civilians accompanying their forces—the dominant but not
exclusive criterion being that the civilians were "subject to military or naval
law"; that nationality in the receiving state, or in a third state, often dis-
qualified a civilian; and that dependents were specifically referred to in only
two agreements, those with Italy and Liberia.
16 Section 64 of the Restatement, Foreign Relations Law, p. 199, states
that "Except as otherwise expressly indicated by the territorial state,
civilians accompanying a force that is present in the territory of another
state with its consent are treated as members of the force for the purposes
of the rules stated in Sections 58-63 only if
(a) they are employed by the sending state to perform duties closely re-
lated to the operation of the force and
(b) they are subject to the rules governing the discipline and internal
administration of the force under the law of the sending state."
See also the Reporters' Note 2 (e) to Section 65, which states that the
NATO Agreement "reflects the rule of international law stated in Sec-
tion 64."
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law of the sending state. 16 This approach met with vigorous
opposition, particularly from the British representative.17 The
disagreement was resolved by incorporating a separate definition
of the civilian component, which speaks of those "in the employ
of an armed service" of the sending state rather than those sub-
ject to its military law, thus according the civilian component a
separate status. 18 Some of the negotiators believed, however, that
16 The American representative stated the definition "arose out of United
States Military Legislation, which assimilated certain categories of civilians
to the military personnel; military legislation applied to them, even in time
of peace, outside the national territories and certain territories under United
States control." MS-R (51) 2. He quoted Article 2 (11) and (12) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 70 A Stat. 37, 10 U.S.C. 802.
17 His objections were: (1) civilians accompanying the armed forces abroad
were, under the law of perhaps a majority of states, subject to military law in
time of peace, but under British law were so subject only in time of war; (2)
as a result, the civilians of some sending states might not enjoy the same
status as those of other sending states; (3) civilians were accorded no im-
munity under the Brussels Treaty; (4) civilians accompanying the United
States forces in the United Kingdom did not have the same status as the
armed forces (but see note 14, supra) ; (5) civilians accompanying armed
forces are few in number, move as individuals or in small groups, and are
not subject to the same close discipline as the armed forces; (6) their
duties are so various that defining those to be included would be difficult,
and would require a system of identification which, in time of stress, might
be difficult to control. MS-R (51) 2; MS-D (51) 3. But in the debate on
the Bill to implement the NATO Agreement, the British Attorney General
said: "We know that visiting forces, including our own, are likely to have
people with them who are not citizens of the receiving country. They are
for all practical purposes a part of the visiting forces. In these circum-
stances it does not seem in the least unreasonable that they should be
covered." 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 1155, (1952).
18 The United States Representative first agreed to eliminate the reference
to military law, proposing to substitute "persons serving with, employed by,
or accompanying the armed forces." He then agreed, when it was objected
that "accompanying" was too vague, to eliminate that word, "since the
civilians in question were accompanying the military forces 'in the execu-
tion of orders*, and, for this reason, they could be regarded as serving with
the military forces or employed by them." Finally, it was agreed it would
be preferable to cover civilians by a separate definition, which should apply
to all civilian components of the armed forces "whether they were employed
by the armed forces or acting under orders." MS (J)-R (51) 1.
The definition ultimately incorporated in the Agreement, Article I 1 (b)
is "the civilian personnel accompanying a force of a Contracting Party who
are in the employ of an armed service of that Contracting Party, and who
are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to
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members of the civilian contingent who were nationals of the re-
ceiving state should in no event be immune from its jurisdiction.
They had agreed that the relationship between a member of a
visiting force and the sending state should be controlling, but
were not prepared to agree that the relationship between a mem-
ber of the civilian contingent and the sending state should prevail
over nationality in the receiving state. The definition of "civilian
component" was therefore framed to exclude nationals of the re-
ceiving state and also those ordinarily resident in that state. This,
coupled with the exclusion of stateless persons and nationals of
states not members of NATO, falls significantly short of a re-
quirement of nationality in the sending state. 19
the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in, the
State in which the force is located."
Difficulties of identification remain. The British Home Secretary, in the
debate on the Bill to implement the NATO Agreement, noted that "* * *
the description of civilian component in the Agreement has not enough legal
certainty to be translated into terms of United Kingdom law, particularly as
the arrangements vary in the different countries. * * *." The Bill hence set
up a procedure for passports to be marked by the sending state and en-
dorsed by an official of the United Kingdom. 505 H.C. Deb. (5th ser.) 568
(1952).
19 "13. With respect to paragraph (b) THE FRENCH REPRESENTA-
TIVE proposed that the definition of the civilian personnel should specify
that such personnel should possess the nationality of the sending State.
Problems difficult to solve might arise, particularly under the application of
Article VII, if the members of the civilian component belonged to a third
nationality or were stateless.
"14. THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE argued that under
United States military regulations, civilian personnel accompanying the
forces were subject to the same discipline as the military personnel. More-
over, the United States would certainly include in the civilian component
persons belonging to a different nationality from that of the sending or
receiving States. The restriction proposed by the French Representative
would leave members of a civilian component belonging to a third nationality
without protection.
"15. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that the French Govern-
ment was primarily concerned to obviate those difficulties which would arise
at the time of entry into France of persons not belonging to the nationality
of a NATO country or stateless persons. In some cases, such persons would
be liable to be refused entry by the French Government.
"16. THE CHAIRMAN proposed that Article I (b) should specify that
the Agreement covered members of a civilian component who were not na-
tionals of the receiving State, and further were neither stateless nor the
nationals of a country other than the NATO countries.
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The definitions in Article I of the NATO Agreement are im-
portant only because they are relevant to the meaning of the
crucial provisions of Article VII, granting and allocating jurisdic-
tion. By Article VII 1. (a) the military authorities of the sending
state can exercise in the receiving state the criminal and dis-
ciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the sending state's
law "over all persons subject to the military law of that State."
To the extent that this gives such authorities the right to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over others than members of their armed
forces, the grant goes beyond any requirement of international
law. The record indicates the concern of some of the negotiators
that this grant might be interpreted too broadly.20 Ultimately
"17. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE signified his willingness to
submit this new wording to his Government."
MS-R (51) 13. See also MS-D (51) 19.
20 "15. In the same paragraph, several amendments had been submitted
with a view to altering the categories of persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the military authorities of the sending State. There were two alternative
proposals: either to replace the existing phrase 'all persons subject to the
military law of the sending State' by the wording 'members of its force or
civilian component', or to add 'dependents'.
"16. Several Representatives expressed the opinion that the existing word-
ing was too comprehensive. Its effect would be to enable the receiving State
to render anyone subject to its jurisdiction, merely by amending those provi-
sions in the national legislation which specified which categories of persons
were subject to military law. On the other hand, the deletion of the term
'persons subject to military law' would prevent the sending State from
exercising its jurisdiction in cases where it would be normal for it to do so
(for example, in the case of a spy). It was argued in reply, that a distinc-
tion should be drawn between two separate problems, first, which persons
were subject to military law, and secondly, what were the powers of the mili-
tary courts. In certain cases and in certain countries, persons who were
not subject to military law (for example, nurses) were nevertheless subject
to the jurisdiction of military courts. Lastly, a number of Representatives
were doubtful whether dependents could be included.
"17. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the existing text
was already a compromise which had been reached after a lengthy discus-
sion. He suggested that the difficulty might be solved by retaining the
existing text as it stood, while adding the paragraph proposed by the Danish
Delegation, which read as follows
:
'The above provisions shall not imply any right for the military au-
thorities of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who
are nationals of or permanent residents in the receiving State, unless
they are members of the forces of the sending State'.
"18. This proposal was accepted by the Working Group, subject to the
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they were apparently satisfied that it would not, generally, be
interpreted to include others than members of a force and the
civilian component.21 They wished, however, to preclude any
possibility that nationals or residents of the receiving state who
had no relation to the visiting force would be considered subject
to the jurisdiction of the sending state. The concern with respect
to the civilian component was primarily that nationals of the re-
ceiving state should continue to be punishable under the local
criminal law; with respect to those having no relation to the
visiting force, the primary concern was to protect them from
foreign jurisdiction.22 It will be recalled that nationals of the
Chairman's reservation of his position with respect to the definition of
residents."
MS-R (51) 14.
21 "8. It was recalled that it had been previously agreed [though the docu-
ments do not so indicate] that the phrase 'persons subject to the military
law* should be replaced by the phrase 'members of a force or civilian
component.'
"9. THE CHAIRMAN pointed out that this paragraph did not call for
the amendment which had been made in other Articles, since there was no
risk of misunderstanding its meaning. The original wording was retained.
"10. THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE was prepared to accept this
wording, but felt bound to point out that the phrase 'subject to military law'
had a very restricted meaning in France in peacetime. This wording would
therefore appreciably reduce the powers of France as a sending State. The
French Government, on their side, would regard members of a force or
civilian component as falling within the scope of the paragraph. The Italian
and Belgian Representatives associated themselves with this statement.
"11. The Working Group agreed that this official statement by the Repre-
sentatives of France, Italy and Belgium should be placed on Record."
MS-R (51) 18.
22 The point was raised by the Danish Government
:
"The Danish Government assumes that the sole purpose of the draft
Agreement is to regulate the status of members of a 'force' or a 'civilian
component' and, to a certain extent, of 'dependents' of the Contracting
Parties. It is, therefore, assumed that the jurisdictional provisions of the
draft do not purport to grant any authority to exercise jurisdiction over
any person that is not a member of its force or civilian components. This
interpretation of Article VII is presupposed in the definition contained in
Article 1 (f) of the draft, and in the provision in paragraph 8 of Article
VII, which also seems to appear from NATO document MS (J)-R (51) 6,
paragraph 11.
"In the opinion of the Danish Government there exists, however, the possi-
bility that, apart from the context, the provisions in paragraph 1(a), para-
graph 2, 1st subsection, and paragraph 3(b) might be interpreted as grant-
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receiving state had been subjected to the jurisdiction of foreign
military authorities in combat zones in wartime. The first of
the World War I agreements had been designed expressly to
negative such jurisdiction. There seems to be no basis whatever
for saying they would be so subject in time of peace, except
possibly for offenses committed on a base being used by a foreign
force. The NATO Agreement, nevertheless, out of what may be
considered an abundance of caution which suggests the major
importance attached to the issue, expressly negatives any in-
ference that the grant of jurisdiction in Article VII 1. (a) ex-
tends to nationals of or those ordinarily resident in the receiving
state, other than members of the visiting force.23
ing to the military authorities of the sending State the right to exercise
jurisdiction (as regards paragraph 3 (b) : subsidiary jurisdiction) even
over nationals and permanent residents of the receiving State, i.e., to the
extent to which these persons, in time of peace or war, come under the
military law of the sending State. In order to clarify this matter beyond
all doubt, the following alternative amendments to Article VII are sub-
mitted :
(a) In paragraph 1(a) and paragraph 2, 1st subsection, the words 'all
persons subject to the military law of that State' and 'persons subject to
the military law of that State' should be substituted by 'members of
their force or civilian component', or
(b) In paragraph 1(a) and paragraph 2, 1st subsection, the words 'all
persons' and 'persons' should be substituted by 'members of their force
or civilian component', or
(c) A new paragraph shall be inserted before the present paragraph 4;
'The above provisions shall not imply the right for the military authori-
ties of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are na-
tionals of or permanent residents in the receiving State, unless they are
members of the forces of the sending State'." MS-D (51) 18. The first two
amendments proposed were rejected but the third adopted. See note 20, supra.
23 Article VII 4 states : "The foregoing provisions of this Article shall
not imply any right for the military authorities of the sending State to
exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily resident
in the receiving State, unless they are members of the force of the sending
State."
The Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies provides in
Article XI (4) that: "The foregoing provision of this Article shall not imply
any right for the military authorities of the United States to exercise
jurisdiction over persons who belong to, or are ordinarily resident in, the
Federation unless they are military members of the United States Forces."
See also Article 8(4) of the Agreement with Australia.
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The status to be accorded dependents occasioned much less
difficulty. Apparently no representative vigorously urged that
dependents were entitled to immunity under international law or
should be accorded any immunity under the Agreement. There
appears to be a complete absence of authority for the conclusion
that any immunity enjoyed by a visiting armed force extends to
dependents. The earlier treaties which regulated the status of
visiting forces only rarely mentioned dependents expressly,24
and it is doubtful that the language of other treaties could be
interpreted broadly enough to include them. In part this reflects
the fact that the problem is largely new.
It has now become not uncommon for dependents to accompany
armed forces, including those of the United States, to some
though not all foreign countries in which such armed forces are
stationed. The negotiators of the NATO Agreement anticipated
this in the NATO area. They did not, however, believe that giv-
ing dependents immunity of any kind in so far as criminal juris-
diction is concerned could be justified. 25 It has been convincingly
demonstrated 26 that an analysis of Article VII of the NATO
Agreement as a whole leads to the conclusion that dependents are
not included among those accorded the agreed immunities
—
though they in fact enjoy certain immunities in some coun-
tries 27—and that the negotiators did not intend they should be.
24 The Agreement between the United States and Liberia of March 31,
1942, 56 Stat. 1621, E.A.S. 275, [1948-49] 23 U.N.T.S. 302, gave immunity
to "the military and civilian personnel of the Government of the United
States and their families"; the Agreement of September 3, 1947 between the
United States and Italy, [1950] 67 U.N.T.S. 16, supra, note 14, also gave
treaty status to dependents. See also the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936,
U.K.T.S. No. 6 (1937).
The Reporters' Note 2 (e) to Section 65 of the Restatement, Foreign Rela-
tions Law, p. 208, states with respect to the status accorded dependents in
the NATO Agreement that: "[T]he parties were in a position to deal with
this special situation not previously regulated by international law."
26 «* * * [Aj number of representatives were doubtful whether dependents
could be included." MS-R (51) 14. One is tempted to suggest an analogy
between dependents and passengers on a ship, or a "stranger to the vessel,"
but the differences are as real as the similarities.
26 Snee and Pye, Status of Forces Agreements and Criminal Jurisdiction
34-40 (1957).
87 The Agreement between the United States and West Germany on the
Status of Persons on Leave covers dependents.
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The status of dependents is nevertheless significant for other
purposes.28
Favorable as the NATO Agreement is to a sending state with
respect to jurisdiction over members of a force and the civilian
component, the jurisdiction which it accords to the military au-
thorities of the sending state falls short of that which Article
2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice purported to give
to American military authorities. Article 2(11) contains no
limitation based on nationality, no requirement that the indi-
vidual be employed by the armed forces in a strict sense, and
was deemed to include dependents.29
The other post-World War II treaties to which the United
States is a party have provisions different from those of the
NATO Agreement defining the classes of persons covered other
than members of the armed forces. Some define the classes
broadly enough apparently to include all those covered by Article
2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, including de-
pendents. Provisions of this type appear in the superseded Con-
vention with West Germany,30 the United States-Ethiopian
88 E.g., an offense by a member of a force or of a civilian component
against a dependent is an inter se offense (Art. VII, 3(a) (i)) and a de-
pendent is entitled, when tried by the receiving state, to the rights enu-
merated in Article VII, 9.
"Dependent" is denned, in Article I, 1(c) as "the spouse of a member of
a force or of a civilian component, or a child of such member depending on
him or her for support." Parents are not included, but are in the Agreement
with Japan, Article I (c) which, however, excludes children over 21 unless
"dependent for over half their support." The Agreement with West Germany
extends the concept to "close relatives" who meet certain requirements.
Article 2, 2(c). But the Agreed Minutes provide that "The authorities of
the forces shall limit as far as possible the number of close relatives * * *
to be admitted to the Federal territory."
Many agreements use the term "dependents" without denning it.
29 Snee and Pye, op. tit. supra note 11, at 15; United States v. Weiman &
Czevtok, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 11 C.M.R. 216 (1953). But see the decisions of
the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of Article 2(11), supra,
note 2.
80 Article 1, 7 defines Members of the Forces to include
:
"(b) Other persons who are in the service of such armed Forces or
attached to them, with the exception of persons who are nationals neither
of one of the Three Powers nor of another Sending State and have been
engaged in the Federal territory; provided that any such persons who
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Agreement,31 the United States-Libyan Agreement 32 and the
Agreement with Korea.33 The Agreement with Japan defines
"civilian component" more broadly than does the NATO Agree-
ment; 34 hence under American primary jurisdiction with respect
are stationed outside the Federal territory or Berlin shall be deemed
to be members of the Forces only if they are present in the Federal
Territory on duty (followers).
"The following are considered 'members of the Forces': dependents who are
the spouses and children of persons defined in subparagraphs (a) and (b)
of this paragraph or close relatives who are represented by such persons
and for whom such persons are entitled to receive material assistance from
the Forces. The definition 'members of the Forces' shall include Germans
only if they enlisted or were inducted into, or were employed by, the armed
Forces of the Power concerned in the territory of that Power and at that
time either had their permanent place of residence there or had been
resident there for at least a year."
81 Article XXIV states : "The term 'United States forces' includes mem-
bers of the armed forces of the United States (including dependents of all
such members) and persons accompanying, serving with or employed by
said forces (including dependents of all such persons) who are subject to
the military laws of the United States, but excluding indigenous Ethiopian
nationals and other persons ordinarily resident in Ethiopian territory pro-
vided that such nationals or other persons are not dependents of members
of the United States forces.
82 Article XXVIII states : " 'United States forces' include personnel be-
longing to the armed services of the United States of America and accom-
panying civilian personnel who are employed by or serving with such
services (including the dependents of such military and civilian personnel),
who are not nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in Libya; and who are in
the territory of Libya in connection with operations under the present
Agreement."
The Agreement with the Federation of the West Indies includes in the
definition of "Members of the United States Forces" in Article I: "[C]ivilian
personnel accompanying the United States Forces and in their employ who
are not ordinarily resident in the Federation and who are there solely for
the purposes of this Agreement" and dependents. But see Article XI (4)
of the Agreement, supra note 23.
88 The United States is granted exclusive jurisdiction "over members of
the United States Military Establishment in Korea"; the phrase is not
further defined. The prior Agreement with Korea, 79 U.N.T.S. 62 (1951),
did, however, accord such exclusive jurisdiction to the Commanding General
"over the personnel of his command, both military and civilian, including
dependents."
84 Article 1 provides that
"In this Agreement the expression*******
(b) 'civilian component' means the civilian persons of United States
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to the "civilian component" apparently extends to a larger class,
but technically does not include dependents. The revised Leased
Bases Agreement takes a different approach. It does not refer to
persons "accompanying," "serving with" or "employed by" the
armed forces. Rather it accords a special status to "a person sub-
ject to United States military or naval law," a phrase the reach
of which has been much restricted by the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court referred to above. Also, the status of those "sub-
ject to United States military or naval law" is not the same as
that of a member of the armed forces. Under the Philippines
Agreement, the concept of the civilian component and of de-
pendents, as such, disappears altogether. Persons in those classes
nevertheless are protected in a sense, in that the United States
has exclusive jurisdiction with respect to all "on-base" offenses,
by whomever committed. Outside a base, however, only members
of the armed forces have an immunity of any kind. Finally,
under the Agreement with Saudi Arabia, no persons other than
"American military personnel," distinguished elsewhere in the
Agreement from "civilian employees of the Mission" and "their
dependents," have any immunity.
More interesting than these variations with respect to the
composition of the civilian component and the inclusion of de-
pendents in or their exclusion from those protected by a treaty
are provisions excluding from either group those closely related
to the receiving state.
The revised Leased Bases Agreement excludes from those given
immunity as persons "subject to United States military or
naval law" one who is "a British subject or local alien" (Art.
IV(l)(c)) but "local alien" is denned (paragraph (9)(b)) to
exclude "a national of the United States who is ordinarily resident
in the Territory." This Agreement is thus more favorable to the
nationality who are in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying,
the United States armed forces in Japan, but excludes persons who are
ordinarily resident in Japan. * * * For the purposes of this Agree-
ment only, dual nationals, United States and Japanese, who are
brought to Japan by the United States shall be considered as United
States nationals."
See United States v. Robertson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 806, 19 C.M.R. 102 (1955)
for an elaborate review of the meaning of "civilian component" under the
prior Administrative Agreement with Japan under Article III of the
Security Treaty. Feb. 28, 1952, 3 UST 3341, TIAS 2492.
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sending state than the NATO Agreement, in that it does not
exclude from the "civilian component" either stateless persons
and nationals of non-NATO states, or United States nationals
ordinarily resident in the receiving state. The Agreement with
Japan, on the other hand, is less favorable to the sending state
than the NATO Agreement. Membership in the "civilian com-
ponent ,, is subject to the affirmative requirement of United States
nationality, and even United States nationals are excluded if
they are "ordinarily resident in Japan." The Administrative
Agreement is unusual also in that it expressly deals with the
case of dual nationality; one who has both United States and
Japanese nationality is considered as a United States national if
"brought to Japan by the United States."
The United States-Ethiopian Agreement protects members of
the armed forces, the civilian component (broadly defined) and
dependents, but apparently excludes from the first two classes
(but not from the third class, dependents) "indigenous Ethiopian
nationals and other persons ordinarily resident in Ethiopian terri-
tory," apparently including United States nationals.35
86 The Convention with West Germany was even more complicated. It
excepted from both members of the forces and the civilian component,
those who were nationals neither of one of the Three Powers nor of another
Sending State "and have been engaged in the Federal territory." The
Convention then added dependents to the class of "Members of the Forces,"
and finally incorporated a general limitation, i.e., "The definition 'members of
the Forces' shall include Germans only if they enlisted or were inducted into,
or were employed by, the armed Forces of the Power concerned in the
territory of that Power and at that time either had their permanent place
of residence there or had been resident there for at least a year." This
clause thus appeared (1) to exclude from the protected class even some
members of the armed forces; (2) further to limit those in the civilian
component entitled to immunity; but (3) not to limit dependents, who
hardly either "enlist" or are "inducted into" or are "employed by" the
armed forces.
The ideas which have found some recognition in the agreements may be
catalogued as follows
:
Civilians who accompany the armed forces have a relationship to the
sending state which justifies according them the agreed immunities, but
such immunities may nevertheless be denied to those who
:
(1) are not, strictly speaking, employed by the armed forces (e.g.,
the NATO Agreement), or
(2) are not nationals of the sending state (e.g., the Agreement with
Japan), or
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It seems entirely appropriate that variations of these kinds
should appear in the status of forces agreements, since the cir-
cumstances which the several agreements govern differ so widely.
The dominant theme is that nationality in the receiving state dis-
qualifies one for any immunity. This can be explained both in
terms of the interest of the receiving state in continuing to con-
trol the conduct of its nationals and in protecting its nationals
from the control of another state. Nationals of third states give
rise to a distinct problem ; if they are disqualified, it is presumably
because the receiving state feels its interest in controlling their
conduct while on its territory is superior to that of the sending
state, based on the employment relationship alone, unsupported
by the tie of nationality. Disqualification on the ground of
residence in the receiving state apparently depends on the same
factors as disqualification on the ground of nationality in that
state, though the receiving state presumably has less interest in
controlling and protecting its residents than in controlling and
protecting its nationals. The balance between the interests of
the sending state and the receiving state becomes even nicer when
the individual is both employed by and a national of the sending
state but ordinarily resides in the receiving state. The problem is
illustrated by the Egyptian case in which a Greek national who
had for long years resided in Egypt but enlisted in the Greek
forces in Egypt, claimed immunity for an offense which consisted
(3) are not nationals at least of one of its allies other than the receiving
state (e.g., the NATO Agreement, and see the superseded Convention
with West Germany) , or
(4) are nationals of the receiving state (e.g., the NATO, revised Leased
Bases and Ethiopian Agreements), or
(5) ordinarily reside in the receiving state (e.g., the NATO and Ethio-
pian Agreements, the Agreement with Japan), or
(6) ordinarily reside in the receiving state and are not nationals of the
sending state (e.g., the revised Leased Bases Agreement), or
(7) were engaged locally and are not nationals of the sending state or of
one of its allies, or were not engaged in the sending state or did
not reside there even though they were engaged there and are na-
tionals of the receiving state (the superseded Convention with West
Germany)
.
Dependents may be, but usually are not, accorded the agreed immunities.
If they are, an exception may be made for dependents who are nationals of
or ordinarily resident in the receiving state (e.g., the Libyan Agreement),
but in other instances no such exception has been made (e.g., the Ethiopian
Agreement and the superseded Convention with West Germany)
.
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of a series of acts stretching back for years prior to his en-
listment.36
It might seem strange that in some agreements neither
nationality nor residence in the receiving state disqualifies a de-
pendent, even though it does a member of the civilian component.
This distinction is, however, understandable, for it reflects the
judgment that family ties provide a stronger link to the sending
state and alienate the individual more completely from the re-
ceiving state than employment by the sending state. Dependents
are likely to live within the foreign military community; local
employees are not. Again, dependents will presumably in time
become residents and nationals of the sending state; for local
employees this is less likely.
THE IMPACT OF REID V. COVERT
The status of forces agreements negotiated prior to Reid v.
Covert 37 were concluded on the assumption that American courts-
martial could exercise jurisdiction over civilians accompanying
our armed forces abroad. Reid v. Covert and the cases 38 applying
and extending its doctrine have established that they may not
—
that Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,39
in purporting to give such jurisdiction to courts-martial in peace-
time, is unconstitutional. What is the effect of those decisions on
the jurisdictional arrangements of these agreements?
The possible alternatives to the jurisdiction of courts-martial
are (1) trial by a civil court of the United States in the receiving
state (2) trial by a civil court of the United States in the United
States or (3) trial by the receiving state. Are these permissible,
or is any of them mandatory, under the several agreements?
It seems too clear for argument that a civil court of the United
States cannot try civilians in any foreign state without the con-
sent of that state. Characteristically, the existing agreements do
not include such consent. Rather, the consent is specifically
88 Stamatopoulos v. Ministere Public, Mixed Court of Cassation, Egypt,
Nov. 23, 1942, [1919-1942] Ann. Dig. (Supp. Vol.) 170 (No. 88).
87 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
88 Supra, note 2.
89 70A Stat. 37, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 802(11) : "Subject to the provisions of any
treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to
any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving with, employed
by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside
the following * * *."
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limited to the exercise of jurisdiction by the military authorities
of the sending state.40 The only agreement which expressly con-
templates that United States civil courts might sit in the receiving
state are the revised Leased Bases Agreement and the Bahama
Islands Agreement.41 Three other agreements may perhaps be
read as consenting to the exercise of jurisdiction by United States
civil courts: those with the Philippines,42 with Denmark regard-
ing Greenland,43 and the expired agreement with the Dominican
40 Article VII of the NATO Agreement provides, in 1 (a), that "the mili-
tary authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within
the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on
them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military
law of that State"; in 2(a) that "The military authorities of the sending
State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons
subject to the military law of that State with respect to offences, including
offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State,
but not by the law of the receiving State"; in 3(a) that "The military au-
thorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise juris-
diction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to"
certain offenses. Where jurisdiction of the receiving state is concerned the
phrase used is, in contrast, "the authorities of the receiving State," not "the
military authorities." The Agreement with Japan, and the Defense Agree-
ment with Iceland contain comparable language. The Convention with West
Germany, Article 6, stated in 1 that "the authorities of the Forces shall
exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of the Force." The
Agreement with Korea provides that "exclusive jurisdiction over members
of the United States Military Establishment in Korea shall be exercised by
courts-martial of the United States." The Agreement with Ethiopia provides,
in Article XVII, 2 that "The United States military authorities shall have
the right to exercise within Ethiopia * * *," and that with Libya contains
similar language.
41 The Bahama Islands Agreement—the revised Leased Bases Agreement
is similar—provides in Article V that "(1) the Government of the United
States of America shall have the right to exercise the following jurisdiction
over offences committed in the Bahama Islands * * *", and jurisdiction is
allocated in part on the basis of whether "a civil court of the United
States is sitting in the Bahama Islands." Significantly, the jurisdiction
allocated to the United States is greater if such civil court is sitting.
"Article XIII provides that "The Philippines consents that the United
States shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction * * *." Article XIV, 2
refers, however, to "cases where the service courts of the United States have
jurisdiction under Article XIII, * * *."
"Article VIII provides that "The Government of the United States of
America shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction * * *." But
the Agreement was, in this respect, subject to being superseded by the
NATO Agreement.
178
Republic.44 The first alternative is therefore available, in any
but these states, only if appropriate agreements are negotiated.
Also, it would require that the United States extend its criminal
law to offenses committed by the civilian component and de-
pendents abroad, since they are no longer subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice.
Whether trial by a civil court in the United States is a per-
missible alternative is a more complex question. Under the NATO
Agreement, since American law does not, in most instances, now
extend to offenses abroad, the receiving state now has exclusive
jurisdiction over both the civilian component and dependents.45
** Article XV (1) provided that "the government of the United States of
America shall have the right to exercise exclusive criminal jurisdic-
tion * * *." But Article XV (2) used the language "Whenever military
authorities of the United States of America may exercise jurisdiction over
an alleged offender * * *." Moreover, the jurisdiction conferred was limited
to "Members of the United States Forces" and "[0]thers subject to United
States military law * * *."
45 "The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and
their dependents with respect to offences * * * punishable by its law but
not by the law of the sending State." Article VII 2(b). The receiving
state always had primary jurisdiction over dependents. Article VII, 2(b),
in giving the receiving state exclusive jurisdiction for offences not punishable
by the law of the sending state, refers to "the law of the sending State,"
not the "military law" of that state. It can therefore be said that when
Article VII, 3 refers to "cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is
concurrent," the meaning is "cases where the right of the military authori-
ties of the sending State and the authorities of the receiving State is con-
current." If it is so read, the subsidiary clauses of Article VII, 3, including
(b), which provides that "In the case of any other offence the authorities
of the receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction,"
can be read as relating only to the allocation of jurisdiction between such
authorities. Article VII, 5(a) points the other way, however, toward the
conclusion that the NATO Arrangements were intended to cover the whole
field. "The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each
other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their
dependents in the territory of the receiving State and in handing them over
to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the
above provisions."
If the argument advanced was accepted, the United States could not, of
course, claim that the civilian component and dependents had any immunity
from the jurisdiction of the receiving state nor that the United States would
have priority to exercise jurisdiction, and in normal course the receiving
state would as a practical matter have the first opportunity to do so. Only
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If, however, the United States should extend its criminal law to
offenses by the civilian component and dependents abroad, the
argument is available that it would be free to exercise jurisdic-
tion through trials in the United States. The argument is that
the NATO Agreement relates only to jurisdiction to enforce, not
to jurisdiction to prescribe, that with respect to jurisdiction to
enforce it purports only to allocate jurisdiction between the mili-
tary authorities of the sending state and the receiving state's
authorities ; that hence it does not preclude the sending state from
exercising jurisdiction over the civilian component and de-
pendents in the manner a state may and normally does over its
nationals and others, for offenses committed abroad.
Article VII is in essence confirmatory of the right of the mili-
tary authorities of the sending state and of the authorities of the
receiving state to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in the receiv-
ing state. The right of the military authorities is, however,
limited to exercising jurisdiction over those "subject to the mili-
tary law of that State," which for the United States now excludes
and for some states always has excluded the civilian component
and dependents.
If the argument suggested is not accepted,46 or if the United
States chooses not so to extend its criminal law, then, under the
NATO Agreement the receiving State alone would have jurisdic-
tion over the civilian component, as well as dependents, under
existing arrangements.
The situation under other agreements than the NATO Agree-
a waiver by the receiving state would then give the United States priority.
If the United States should elect so to extend and enforce its criminal law
—
in spite of the many obstacles, legal and practical, to effective administra-
tion—the negotiation of implementing agreements would seem to be at least
advisable.
*6
It can also be argued that the inability of the United States to exercise
jurisdiction by courts-martial, as contemplated in the NATO Agreement,
among others, constitutes a waiver under the appropriate provisions of the
agreement, giving jurisdiction to the receiving state. See People v. Acierto,
Philippines, Sup. Ct., Jan. 30, 1953 [1953] Int. L.R. 148, holding that where
the United States concluded a Philippine national employed on a piece-
work basis by the United States on a base was not subject to court-martial
jurisdiction, there was a waiver which entitled the Philippines to exercise
jurisdiction under the Agreement. See generally Daniels, "The Legal Basis
of German Criminal Jurisdiction over United States Forces Civilians," 3
JAG Bulletin 26 (1961). Cf. Re Gadois, France, Court of Appeal of Paris
(Chambre des mises en accusation), Dec. 14, 1953, [1953] Int. L.R. 186.
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ment may be but is not necessarily the same. The Libyan authori-
ties appear now to have jurisdiction over the civil component and
dependents,47 although again it would not necessarily be exclusive
if the United States saw fit to extend its criminal law to cover
offences in Libya. In Ethiopia,48 Korea,49 and perhaps the Philip-
pines,50 on the other hand, a hiatus may exist. This last situation
could lead a receiving state to claim that, since the status of
forces arrangements were made on the promise, express or im-
plied, that the United States could and would exercise jurisdiction
over the civilian component and dependents, 51 its inability to ful-
fill that duty relieves the receiving state of the obligation to re-
spect the arrangements relating to the civilian component and
dependents. The result would appear to be a reversion to the rule
of international law in the absence of agreement, i.e., no im-
munity for the civilian component and dependents, and concur-
rent jurisdiction.52
47 Article XX of the Agreement, (1) and (2), authorize the United States
military authorities "to exercise * * * all criminal and disciplinary jurisdic-
tion conferred on them by the laws of the United States of America over
members of the United States forces * * * and in every case where such
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction exists, the members of the United
States forces shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the Libyan courts,"
but "in other cases the Libyan courts shall exercise jurisdiction unless the
Government of the United Kingdom of Libya waives its right to exercise
jurisdiction." Since "such criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction" no longer
exists, the immunity no longer exists with respect to the civilian component
and dependents.
" Article XVII 3 of the Ethiopian Agreement provides : "Members of the
United States forces shall be immune from the criminal jurisdiction of
Ethiopian courts * * *."
49 The Agreement with Korea provides that "exclusive jurisdiction over
members of the United States Military Establishment in Korea will be
exercised by courts-martial of the United States." See also Article VIII of
the Agreement with Denmark regarding Greenland.
60 The Philippines Agreement can be read to give the United States ex-
clusive jurisdiction over "on-base" offenses, but was interpreted by a
Philippines court merely to give it primary jurisdiction over such offenses.
See People v. Acierto, note 46, supra.
61 For example, Article II of the NATO Agreement provides: "It is the
duty of a force and its civilian component and the members thereof as well
as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State * * *. It is also
the duty of the sending State to take necessary measures to that end."
52 Unless, as may be true under the NATO Agreement, the result is ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the receiving state.
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Possibly, in the alternative, it could be said that since these
agreements were predicated on a mistake of law 53 or, specifically,
on a mistake as to the limitations of the American Constitution,54
they are, as regards the civilian component and dependents, no
longer effective. The result again would be a reversion to the
situation under international law in the absence of agreement.
Another possible approach to the whole problem, suggested by
the Court, 55 is to incorporate civilians into the armed forces. The
extent to which that could be done appears to be more a question
of constitutional law than of international law. The definitions
in our agreements are broad enough to suggest some leeway, al-
though there are undoubtedly limits beyond which we could not
go without dissent from the receiving state. 56 The interested De-
partments have so far, however, rejected this solution.57
es "Writers on international law are in general agreement that errors of
law do not have the same juridical effect as is produced by errors of fact,
and that international law does not recognize that States may take ad-
vantage of their ignorance of the law to free themselves from treaty obliga-
tions resulting from such ignorance." Harvard Research, Law of Treaties,
29 A.J.I.L. Supp., at 1129 (1935).
64 But see 2 Hyde, International Law, 1385 (2d ed. 1945). Usually the
argument is made by a state which seeks to avoid the consequences of a
concession made by it in the treaty. The argument seems much less persua-
sive when the concession was made to it, and its internal law makes it im-
possible for it to claim the advantages of the concession.
B6 McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 286 (1960).
66 The NATO Agreement, in Art. I, 1(a), defines "force" as "the personnel
belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of one Contracting Party."
The revised Leased Bases Agreement, in Article IV, 9(c) defines "member of
a United States force" as "a member (entitled to wear the uniform) of the
naval, military or air forces of the United States of America." Compare
Chow Hung Ching v. The King, 77 Commw. L.R. (Aust.) 449 (1948).
57 "We have examined Mr. Justice Clark's suggestion that overseas civilian
employees might be incorporated directly into the armed services, either by
compulsory induction or by voluntary enlistment. For a variety of reasons,
this proposal was rejected as undesirable and infeasible.
In addition, the following alternatives and combinations thereof are also
under consideration
:
1. Military status acquired through written agreement or oath to submit
to the laws and regulations for the Government and discipline of the Armed
Forces.
2. Constitutional amendment.
3. Host nation trials.
4. Domestic trials in Federal district courts.
5. Oversea trials in itinerant Federal district courts.
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It should be kept clearly in mind that the decisions of the
Supreme Court in no way affect members of the armed forces.
Their status remains that accorded to them in the several status
of forces agreements or, in the absence of an agreement, that
recognized by international law. The status of the civilian com-
ponent and of dependents accompanying our armed forces has,
however, been markedly altered by those decisions. Their status
can no longer be determined solely by reference to the relevant
agreement, but only by reading the agreement in the light of the
decisions. Generally, any immunity accorded them has been nulli-
fied, and the civilian component and dependents are subject to
6. Oversea trials in special tribunals convened by the military but con-
sisting of civilian judges and juries.
Each of these involves various problems. The last three present the
delicate question whether foreign nations would give their consent to such
trials and whether the Congress would, if necessary, agree to reciprocal
treatment for crimes committed by foreign civilians in this country. Trials
abroad also present problems of impaneling grand and petit juries, sub-
penaing foreign witnesses, and establishing staffs of prosecuting attorneys.
Trials in the United States present problems of our authority overseas to
arrest offenders, of extradition, and of subpenaing and transporting foreign
witnesses.
In addition to these procedural problems, there are substantive ones as
well. At the threshold is the constitutional question whether the Federal
Government has the power to legislate concerning common-law crimes com-
mitted by American citizens overseas, particularly offenses against foreign
nationals.
Assuming that this power exists, should new penal laws be confined to
crimes committed "on base"—which is apparently the outer limit of the
statutory "maritime and territorial jurisdiction" as defined in 18 U.S.C.
7(3)— assuming that section to be applicable—or extend to all crimes re-
gardless of locus?
Should such laws apply to military employees and dependents, to all
Government employees and their dependents, to tourists?
Could distinctions between classes of civilians abroad constitutionally be
drawn?
What kind of crimes should be covered—minor as well as major?
What should the penalties be?
Should the District of Columbia Code be incorporated by reference?
If so, should subsequent amendments thereto be automatically extended to
offenses abroad; should other Federal district courts be bound to follow the
interpretations of the District of Columbia District Court?" Mr. Benjamin
Forman, Asst. General Counsel, Department of Defense, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess., June 8, 1960.
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the jurisdiction of the receiving state, as they are under interna-
tional law in the absence of a treaty.
This does not mean, however, that the concepts "the civilian
component" and "dependents" are no longer significant. An
offense by a member of a force may be an inter se offense, over
which the sending state has primary jurisdiction, where the
victim is a member of the civilian component or a dependent,58 as
well as where the victim is a member of the force. More impor-
tant, a member of the civilian component or a dependent is com-
monly entitled, when tried by the receiving state, to all the rights
guaranteed an accused member of a force.59 It is most interesting
that in the Australian Agreement, negotiated after Reid v. Covert
and its companion cases 60 were handed down, both the terms
"members of the civilian component" and "dependent" are de-
fined very broadly.61 It is understandable that a receiving state
should be prepared to agree to such broader definitions where the
effect of inclusion in a class is not to qualify the receiving stated
jurisdiction over the included persons, but the more limited
effect noted.
58 See Chapter IX, infra.
69 See Chapter XIII, infra.
60 Note 2, supra.
61 "Article 1.
In this Agreement, except where the contrary intention appears
:
* * *
'members of the civilian component* means civilian personnel in
Australia in connection with activities agreed upon by the two Govern-
ments who are neither nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in, Australia,
but who are
:
(a) employed by the United States Forces or by military sales ex-
changes, commissaries, officers' clubs, enlisted men's clubs or other
facilities established for the benefit or welfare of United States person-
nel and officially recognized by the United States authorities as non-
appropriated fund activities ; or
(b) serving with an organization which, with the approval of the
Australian Government, is accompanying the United States Forces;
'dependent' means a person in Australia who is the spouse of, or other
relative who depends for support upon, a member of the United States
Forces or of the civilian component."

